|
Our Staff

Intellectual Property
Operational Excellence
Innovation

TRIZ Experts

Article of
the Month
Case Studies
Press Releases
Links

|
ARTICLE ARCHIVE
January 2007
|
return
to archive list this
month's article
Changing
your Business Technology?
The first question to ask is How
are the people using the business processes going to react?
by Dave Ramsey
Over the
past decade, enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems offerings
from SAP, Oracle, J. D. Edwards, PeopleSoft, Baan and others
have become the dominant business information systems software
platform for companies and government bodies in the US and
other western oriented countries. The rise of ERP systems
represents a fundamental shift in the nature of business information
systems and of even greater importance, in the total business
process.
Compared
with the MRP and other scheduling, purchasing, and customer
service systems, ERP systems offer significantly increased
sophistication that enables integration of software and underlying
relational databases across all functional areas (accounting,
human resources, operations and logistics, sales and marketing).
This potentially allows the organization to have a seamless
integration of all the information flowing through the
organization. It presents managers, who have struggled,
at great expense and with great frustration, with incompatible
information systems and inconsistent operating practices,
the promise of an off-the-shelf solution to the problem of
business integration (Davenport 1998, p. 121).
However,
as Davenport and others have noted, gaining such benefits
are not without difficulties. ERP systems are complex software
systems presenting major technical challenges and usually
requiring large investments in time and money. More importantly,
they cause the organization to have to tackle a significant
management problem. To achieve the highest level of integration,
ERP systems have their own internal best practice
business processes. Thus, the organization is forced to change
their culture when they the implement the software.
When the
implementation takes place, the organization has to reconcile
the technology of the software systems with the strategic
and management needs of the organization. Unlike other systems
such as MRP and MRPII, ERP systems require the organization
to adapt to the software instead of adapting the software
to the organizations established processes. If the organization
successfully adapts to the software, significant gains in
productivity, speed of reaction, streamlined data flows and
direct access to real time operating information can be achieved.
If the organization cannot adapt to the demands for change
then operating and management benefits become elusive. Even
in the best of adaptations, the change process may become
problematic and cause wasted dollars, time, and effort.
This article
illustrates what happens with one such company that made the
decision to adopt and implement an ERP system. While the actual
activities took place several years ago, the lessons that
the implementation reveals are still important for todays
business organization.
In June
2000, Nestle SA signed a much-publicized contract with SAP
and threw in an additional $80 million for consulting
and maintenance to install an ERP system for its global
enterprise. The Switzerland-based consumer goods giant intends
to use the SAP system to help centralize a conglomerate that
owns 200 operating companies and subsidiaries in 80 countries.
Not surprisingly,
a move of this magnitude sparked skepticism. Anne Alexandre,
an analyst who covers Nestle for HSBC Securities in London
(the company is traded only in Europe), downgraded her recommendation
on Nestle stock a year after the project was announced. While
she says that the ERP system will likely have long-term benefits,
she is wary of what the project will do to the company along
the way. It touches the corporate culture, which is
decentralized, and tries to centralize it, she says.
Thats risky. Its always a risk when you
touch the corporate culture.
Its
a risk that Jeri Dunn, vice president and CIO of Nestle USA,
knows well. In 1997, the Glendale, CA based company embarked
upon an SAP project code named BEST (business excellence through
systems technology). By the time the project reaches the finish
line, BEST will have gobbled up six years and more than $200
million (the same amount that the global parent intends to
spend). Dunn now says she sees the light at the end of the
tunnel. The last rollouts will take place in the first quarter
of 2003. But the implementation has been fraught with dead
ends and costly mistakes. It is a cautionary tale, full of
lessons not only for its Swiss parent but also for Fortune
1000 companies intent on enterprise-wide software implementation.
The above
paragraphs begin a case study on ERP implementation published
in the May 2002 CIO magazine titled Nestlés
ERP Odyssey. The article continues ... Regardless of
the projects ROI, the lessons learned are real. The
primary lesson Dunn says she has taken away from the project
is this: No major software implementation is really about
the software. Its about change management. If
you werent concerned with how business the business
ran, you could probably [install the ERP software] in 18 to
24 months, she says. Then you would probably be
in the unemployment line in 19 to 25 months.
In order
to understand the challenges of ERP implementation that Nestle
faced, it is important to understand what ERP software is
designed to do and what it really does.
What
is ERP?
Enterprise
planning software or ERP doesnt live up to its name.
In fact the software does very little regarding planning and
the resources are only bits of information about the inputs
for the organization. ERPs true use is oriented for
the entire enterprise or organization. The software attempts
to integrate all departments and functions across a company
onto a single computer system that can serve all those departments
particular needs.
Consider
that each department usually has a separate stand-alone system
custom tailored for the way that department does business.
ERP attempts to combine them all together into a single, integrated
software program that runs off a single database so that various
departments can more easily share information and communicate
with each other. More information allows better and timelier
decisions and better-informed customers and employees.
There
are costs for implementing the ERP solution however. Software
that is capable of integrating the organization is rather
costly. What often is not measured, however, are the hidden
costs. The largest hidden cost is the challenge of motivating
the staff to accept the changes caused by the change to the
new ERP system. In addition to the costs associated with change,
the following areas are most likely to be hidden
costs that significantly affect the budget and result in cost
and time overruns.
1.
Training
Training is the first choice of experienced implementers
as the most under estimated budget item. This is caused
by the fact that workers have to learn an entirely new set
of processes, not just the new software interface. The real
issue is that in order for the training to be effective
it must address and teach not only how to use the software
but also how the organization does business. Because it
takes a greater understanding of the whole system of business
processes, training must be customized and must be of greater
depth.
2.
Integration and testing
The links between the ERP package and other corporate software
must be tested on a case-by-case basis. If these links can
be purchased and pre-integrated then costs are somewhat
minimized, but if they must be created by the organization,
then they get costly. The testing of the installed system
must be done from a process-oriented perspective also. Because
of the integration, changes made in one area may affect
other areas in an adverse manner causing unforeseen cost.
3.
Customization
In many instances the organization is unable or unwilling
to change its processes to fit the software. In this case
a customization of the software must take place. When
customization of the core ERP software takes place the
organization is dealing with the risk of major problems
stemming again from the need for integration of all areas
of the organization. It requires the hiring of additional
staff to do the customization plus the need to keep them
in order to maintain the system after the changes are
made.
4.
Data conversion
Moving data such as customer and supplier records, product
design data and related software from one system to another
is expensive. Adding to the cost is the problem presented
by the fact that the data being moved is often in need of
cleaning and maintenance. The costs and time associated
with the cleaning and maintenance of the data is often underestimated.
In addition
to these four key areas, costs and problems associated with
ERP implementation can include loss of key personnel due to
recruiting from consultancies and other companies that have
likewise lost their best people, delay in ROI, and lost productivity
after the new system goes live due to the fact that the staff
must adapt to the new software.
In the
Nestle case several issues caused the difficulties in the
implementation. Nestle was a collection of independently operating
brands owned by the Swiss-based parent. Even though brands
had been unified and reorganized into Nestle USA, the company
continued to function like a holding company instead of a
single entity. I dont think they knew how ugly
it was, says Dunn referring to the companys condition.
We had nine different ledgers and 28 points of customer
entry. We had multiple purchasing systems. We had no clue
how much volume we were doing with a particular vendor because
every factory set up their vendor masters and purchased their
own.
The problem
with integrating the separate systems is illustrated by the
fact that at the time of the decision to implement ERP, there
were 29 different brands of vanilla, a key ingredient in the
majority of Nestlés products. A team that was
assessing the various systems across the company found that
there were 29 different prices for vanilla all to the
same vendor who supplied the vanilla to all the divisions.
It was found that there was an inability to check for uniform
pricing because each division named the vanilla whatever they
wanted to. In one division vanilla was ingredient 1234, in
another division it was 7778.
The technical
problems faced by Nestle were exacerbated by the way Nestle
made the necessary implementation decisions. A team of 50
top business executives and 10 senior IT professionals made
the majority of the decisions regarding implementation. The
teams goal was to create the required best practices
that would become the common processes used by every division
of Nestle USA. All the divisions and their functions
manufacturing, finance, purchasing, and sales would
have to give up their old approaches and accept the new Nestle
way.
As the
system came together, the roll out of the first three modules
was planned. Before the modules could be rolled out however,
the staff that was to use the new system rebelled. The rebellion
was caused by the fact that none of the groups who were directly
affected by the new processes and systems were represented
on the stakeholder teams. Consequently, department heads,
division heads and heads of sales were constantly surprised
by something being brought to the executive steering committee
that they had not been privy to. In summary, the implementation
team had been naïve in not knowing how the implementation
needed to be managed.
The initial
rebellion continued and magnified. By the beginning of the
planned implementation, the rollout had been reduced to chaos.
Not only did workers not understand how to use the system,
they didnt even understand the new processes. And the
divisional executives, who were just as confused as their
employees and even angrier didnt go out
of their way to help. Dunn reports that her help desk
calls reached 300 per day.
As a result
of the mismanagement of the change, morale tumbled. No one
wanted to learn the new system and turnover among the employees
who forecast demand for Nestle products reached 77 percent.
The planners were simply unable or unwilling to abandon their
spreadsheets for the complexities of the new system. After
6 months of fighting problems, the project was halted. The
company removed one of the projects co-leaders and gave
full responsibility to the other.
The ERP
project at Nestle contains all the areas where organization
change can go wrong. In an article titled The Essentials
of Strategic Change Management Noel Tichy, a professor
at the University of Michigan Business School, states the
fact that organizations need to examine three systems within
the organization before change takes place. The three systems
according to Tichy are the technical, the political, and the
cultural systems.
The three
systems are portrayed as three interrelated strands of rope.
While from a distance the three strands are not distinguishable
from each other they are still there and their interactions
need to be understood so that effective change can take place.
Additionally, like a rope, the three strands can become unraveled.
When they become unraveled, they become weakened. It is the
same problem faced by the Nestle ERP project team.
In the
Nestle case, the implementation team caused all three parts
of the system to be disturbed and come unraveled. The technical
strand by the changes in software and IT architecture; the
political by not including the division heads and other key
executives in the decision making regarding best practices;
and the cultural by rolling out the implementation into the
staff that had not been prepared for the magnitude of changes
necessary to conform to the new system.
Tichy
prescribes some basic principles to guide the development of
integrated technical, political, and cultural change.
-
Technical,
political, and cultural systems are loosely coupled. First
it must be recognized that these three systems are interdependent
but in a loose way, at times in a haphazard way. An effective
organization is one in which there is a reasonable degree
of congruence among the three systems.
-
It
is necessary to develop an image of the organization with
its loosely coupled technical, political and cultural systems
aligned. The desired state must include a panoramic view
of the technical, political and cultural systems. The desired
stat should not be developed with an image of only one system,
or even of all three, focused on individually. To actually
start working on the change however requires being able
to work on individual strands.
-
Strategic
change requires uncoupling or unbundling the three systems.
Organizations tend to evolve to states in which the three
systems are mutually reinforcing. For example, the technical
system the way in which work is organized and product
is sold is generally supportive of the political
structure within which it operates. There is generally a
culture present within the organizations that rewards and
encourages behavior congruent with the technical and political
systems. For strategic change to occur, it is necessary
to be able to unhook or uncouple these systems from each
other, thus making it possible to intervene separately in
each system, much as it is necessary to pull the strands
of a rope apart to work on a single strand.
-
Plan
for re-coupling the system. Explicit attention is required
so that the three systems can be helped to re-couple to
each other. A major part of a strategic change process involves
reconnecting the three strands (Tichy, p 66).
In the
Nestle case, the group charged with the re-start eventually
realized that the principles illustrated by Tichy had been
overlooked by the initial implementation team. It was necessary
to begin at the beginning and make the necessary changes to
allow enough time and resources to make sure that they had
support from the key divisional heads and all the employees
knew exactly what changes were taking place, when, why, and
how.
A
year later a new plan and road map for implementation was complete.
A person who was responsible solely for being liaison between
the project team and the divisions was brought on board and
regular meetings were being held with division heads. Additionally,
surveys of how the employees affected by the new systems were
dealing with the change were routinely conducted.
There
are five lessons that can be learned from this case:
1. Dont start a project with a deadline in mind.
Figure out the project requirements, and then determine
how long it will take you to accomplish them.
2. Update your budget projection at regular intervals. So
many things happen during a long project that you will be
lucky to stay on target during a particular year, let alone
the life of a project. Frequently revisiting your numbers
will help minimize troublesome surprises.
3. ERP isnt about the software. Its easy to
put a new system in place. The hard part is changing the
business processes of the people who will use the system.
4. Nobody likes process change, particularly when they dont
know its coming. Include in the planning those people
whose processes you are changing. Keep the communication
open while the project is in the works, and measure the
level of acceptance before, during, and after the roll out.
5. Remember the integration points. It isnt enough
to simply install new systems; you need to make sure that
they can talk to each other.
References
Booth,
Peter, et al, 2000, The impacts of Enterprise Resource
Planning Systems on Accounting Practice The Australian
Experience, Australian Accounting Review, Vol.
10 No. 3
Davenport,
T. H., 1998, Putting the enterprise into the enterprise
system, Harvard Business Review, July-August:
121-33
Koch,
Christopher, 2002, The ABCs of ERP, CIO
Magazine, February 7, 2002
PeopleSoft,
2002, Rapid Response Strategies for Todays Manufacturers,
a white paper published by PeopleSoft, 2/2002
Scala
Business Solutions, 2002, Collaborative ERP the
Second-generation of Realistic E-business, a white paper
published by Scala Business Solutions N. V.
Worthen,
Ben. 2002, Nestlés ERP Odyssey, CIO
Magazine, May 15, 2002
|
|
|
|